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Abstract 
 
Objective probability in quantum mechanics is often thought to involve a 
stochastic process whereby an actual future is selected from a range of 
possibilities. Everett’s seminal idea is that all possible definite futures on 
the pointer basis exist as components of a macroscopic linear 
superposition. I demonstrate that these two conceptions of what is 
involved in quantum processes are linked via two alternative 
interpretations of the mind-body relation. This leads to a fission, rather 
than divergence, interpretation of Everettian theory and to a novel 
explanation of why a principle of indifference does not apply to self-
location uncertainty for a post-measurement, pre-observation subject, just 
as Sebens and Carroll claim. Their Epistemic Separability Principle is 
shown to arise out of this explanation and the derivation of the Born rule 
for Everettian theory is thereby put on a firmer footing. 
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  (Brown, 1996, 189) 
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1. Two concepts of objective probability 
 
Since the advent of quantum mechanics it has been widely thought by 
physicists that there may be two types of probability in the world, 
objective and subjective. Subjective probability is familiar as ‘degree of 
belief’ or ‘credence’. It’s a tool of everyday life. Objective probability is 
more problematic. A common term for it is ‘chance’, the idea of an 
arbitrary process selecting one possibility from a range of alternatives, but 
a selection guided by the alternatives’ probabilities. A bridled randomness 
which has come to be known as stochasticity. 
It can seem that Hugh Everett III’s ‘relative state’ formulation of 
quantum mechanics (1957) does without a concept of objective 
probability. Indeed he changed the title of his thesis to Wave Mechanics 
without Probability. And some Everett theorists concur (Brown, 2011, 6; 
Groisman et al., 2013, 696). My purpose here is to argue that there’s scope 
for retaining a concept of objective probability in Everettian theory via an 
alternative to the standard stochastic interpretation of probabilistic 
processes. Furthermore, that alternative arises out of a startling change of 
perspective on the identity of observers within Everett’s multiverse which 
helps to resolve a problematic aspect of the theory.  
I shall begin with a thought experiment which suggests that there’s a 
link between that alternative concept of objective probability and an 
alternative to a standard interpretation of the mind-body relation. I shall 
then defend the alternative mind-body relation in detail before going on to 
use it in an Everettian context. 
The thought experiment is to take place in a setting provided by 
contemporary cosmology, which gives a precise meaning to the term 
‘parallel universes’. Space may be infinite and contain an infinite number 
of galaxies but there are only a trillion or two in our local region. Our 
observable universe is finite, and according to quantum mechanics any 
finite region can only occupy a finite number of possible observable states, 
so if there are an infinite number of galaxies there may be any number of 
regions which are exactly like our own, down to the finest observable 
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detail (Tegmark, 2007, 104). Those regions are universes which are 
parallel to ours. What follows brings a change of perspective on them. 
Consider a large ensemble of parallel universes in which stochastic 
quantum mechanics operates, that is, where a single actual outcome of a 
probabilistic process is understood to be stochastically selected from a 
range of possible outcomes. On such a view objective probabilities exist, 
albeit that their values can only ever be estimated via statistical methods 
which assume the law of large numbers. 
We are to focus attention on an idealised quantum measurement 
where there are two possible definite outcomes on the pointer basis. A 
pointer on the apparatus moves left for outcome L and right for outcome 
R. The objective probabilities yielded by the Born rule for these outcomes 
are pL and pR and we can assume that those values have been statistically 
confirmed to a high degree of subjective probability. 
At corresponding positions in each parallel universe we have 
apparatuses ready to make ‘parallel counterpart’ measurements.  As the 
results come up the initial set of universes partitions into a subset where 
the result is L and a subset where the result is R.  
Now introduce observers about to make a measurement. There are 
only two ways of doing this, so far as I know. The usual way is to 
associate an individual observer with a parallel counterpart organism in 
each universe. Each observer states, ‘For this upcoming quantum 
measurement there are two possible outcomes and on statistical evidence I 
assign objective probabilities pL and pR to those outcomes, with 
subjective probability p(pL, pR)’. That statement is interpreted as being 
true because it refers to a stochastic process where exclusively one or the 
other of the outcomes will occur with probabilities pL and pR. The 
observer is bound to be uncertain to some degree as what the values of the 
probabilities are but the idea that quantum measurement involves a 
stochastic process implies that precise probabilities are associated with 
each outcome. The observers’ statements are not strictly true since 
quantum mechanics allows for many bizarre outcomes with minute 
probabilities as well as the outcomes L and R, but let that pass. 
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A less usual way of introducing the observer is to associate a single 
individual with the set of parallel counterpart organisms. In that case there 
is just a single utterance of ‘For this upcoming quantum measurement 
there are two possible outcomes and on statistical evidence I assign 
objective probabilities pL and pR to those outcomes, with subjective 
probability p(pL, pR)’. The parallel counterpart sonic emissions by the 
organisms do not each give voice to an utterance. The single utterance is 
voiced by the set of those sonic emissions. We have a single observer, call 
her Hydra. She sees a single apparatus before her which is constituted by 
the set of parallel counterpart apparatuses. That apparatus is going to 
partition into a subset where the outcome is L and a subset where the 
outcome is R. As a result, the parallel counterpart organisms are going to 
be subject to differing stimuli giving rise to cognitive differences and so 
the fissioning of Hydra into HydraL who sees a pointer move left and 
HydraR who sees a pointer move right. 
Ted Sider has provided us with a metaphysics of transtemporal 
identity which is well suited to this situation (2001, 201). He introduces a 
concept of temporal counterparts analogous to David Lewis’s modal 
counterparts (1968) and identifies continuant objects with momentary 
stages. Thus single apple resting in a fruit bowl is not the same thing from 
one moment to the next. Rather, at any given moment an apple bears the 
relation will be to apples which are its future counterparts and the relation 
was to apples which are its past counterparts. 
So Hydra can be described as bearing the relation will be to each of 
her future temporal counterparts, HydraL and HyrdraR, though she does not 
bear that relation to the pair of them. Hydra will not become two people. A 
modal analogy is this: suppose that you were born in Africa, then you 
might have been born in America (if your mother had moved there whilst 
pregnant) and you might have been born in Asia; but you could not have 
been born in America and in Asia.  
HydraL and HydraR, two distinct people, each bear the relation was 
to their past temporal counterpart, Hydra. The leftward pointer and the 
rightward pointer are sets of parallel counterparts which are future 
temporal counterparts of the ready pointer. True, Sider’s stage theory has 
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the odd consequence that many people have worked on writing these very 
words but it’s arguably not impossibly odd since they are all people who I, 
now, was. Likewise, there would have been many apples resting in the 
fruit bowl overnight, though only one apple and one bowl at any given 
moment. 
In the spirit of Donald Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ (1973) 
Hydra can be interpreted as speaking truly when she makes her single 
utterance of ‘For this upcoming quantum measurement there are two 
possible outcomes and on statistical evidence I assign objective 
probabilities pL and pR to those outcomes, with subjective probability 
p(pL, pR)’. What she refers to is an apparatus which will fission into 
subset apparatuses where L and R occur. What she refers to as possibilities 
are multiple future actualities which are causally connected with her 
perceived environment, and what she refers to as the objective 
probabilities of those possibilities are her estimation of the measures of the 
L and R subsets of her apparatus relative to the set which is the apparatus 
in the ready state. There will be more on causality in Hydra’s environment 
in the next section. 
What this suggests is that a concept of a non-modal objective 
probability is intelligible; a concept of objective probabilities which attach 
to a range of actualities rather than of possibilities. This may seem to be 
flirting with absurdity. Before even beginning to seriously entertain the 
idea it must be established that the alternative ‘unitary interpretation of 
mind’ is itself intelligible, which I shall attempt to do in the next section. It 
is a radical proposal which requires careful scrutiny, but it has long been 
thought that making sense of a reality underpinning quantum phenomena 
will require a radical conceptual shift. 
 
2. The unitary interpretation of mind 
 
The idea that ‘a plurality of worlds’ exists which contains worlds parallel 
to ours has been around for a long time and it has always seemed natural to 
think of those parallel worlds as far off in the distance but if we adopt 
Hydra’s perspective they are all right here. In some sense our perceived 
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environment must be a sort of ‘superposition’ of parallel universes if such 
exist. 
Gottfried Leibniz put these words into the mouth of an interlocutor 
in a dialogue: 
what is to prevent us from saying that these two persons who are at 
the same time in these two similar but inexpressibly distant spheres, 
are not one and the same person? Yet that would be a manifest 
absurdity. 
(Leibniz, 1704, Bk.II, Ch.xxvii, 245) 
This expresses exactly the thought in the Hydra scenario. More recently 
the idea has been discussed in (Zuboff, 1974, 374; 1991, 41-2; Bostrom, 
2006, 186-8). A much fuller development is to be found in (Tappenden, 
2011a, sections 2, 4 and 5 ) which I shall summarise here. 
First of all, it can indeed seem ‘manifestly absurd’ that parallel 
counterpart organisms vastly separated in space could be multiple 
instances of a single mind if it is thought that there must be some sort of 
causal connection between them. But all that radical interpretation requires 
is that the organisms and the environments with which they interact should 
be isomorphic. With that in mind we can approach interpreting Hydra’s 
speech and behaviour. 
Hydra says ‘I see a single apparatus before me which has a mass of 
one kilogram’. For this to be interpreted as true she cannot be referring to 
the aggregate of the parallel counterpart apparatuses since that has a much 
greater mass, but another type of collective is available, the set of the 
apparatuses. Usually sets are thought to be abstract but that is not a 
requirement. Willard Van Orman Quine suggested that some sets could be 
regarded as concrete when he wrote: 
none of the utility of class theory is impaired by counting an 
individual, its unit class, the class of that unit class, and so on, 
as one and the same thing. 
(1969, 31) 
Quine’s proposal violates the Axiom of Foundation and Lewis’s ‘Main 
Thesis’ that ‘the parts of a class are all and only its subclasses’ (1991, 7), 
and has not in fact been made use of in set theory but there is no argument 
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that I know of which dismisses it as unintelligible. So it appears possible 
that Hydra can be understood to be referring to a single apparatus in her 
perceived environment which is constituted by a set of parallel counterpart 
apparatuses each of which is its own sole element. In that case we can 
understand Hydra to perceive her apparatus as having the mass which all 
its elements have in common, i.e. one kilogram. 
To emphasise this point, imagine that into the ensemble of parallel 
universes which Hydra’s mind spans we were able to introduce parallel 
counterpart black boxes with causally isolated interiors so that they could 
contain anisomorphic contents. The contents of the box in Hydra’s 
environment would be a set with anisomorphic elements. If Hydra were to 
open the box each of the parallel counterpart organisms which are 
elements of her body would move in concert and, on receiving different 
stimuli from the box’s contents, cognitive change would be induced so 
causing Hydra to fission. ‘Oh, it’s a duck!’ HydraDUCK would exclaim, and 
‘Oh, it’s a rabbit!’ HydraRABBIT. This makes it clear that an object in 
Hydra’s environment can only be perceived by her to have definite 
physical properties if all the elements of that object have those properties 
in common. 
Parallel observable universes in an infinite space are separated by 
vast spatial distances and simultaneity is relative so in what sense does 
Hydra’s reference to places and times relate to space and time? She says, 
‘My laboratory is about one mile NNE of the Big Ben clock tower which 
is showing four o’clock’. Charitable interpretation allows us to understand 
that she’s referring to a clock tower which is a set of parallel counterpart 
clock towers each of which indicates corresponding places and times in the 
parallel universes which her mind spans. The times and places to which 
Hydra refers in her perceived environment are sets of parallel counterpart 
times and places. 
A worry may remain. We commonly understand a person’s action to 
be caused by beliefs and desires. Hydra believes that she has a quantum 
measurement apparatus before her and desires to operate it, which is why 
she extends an index finger to press the button. When she acts, all the 
doppelgangers which are elements of her body move in concert to extend 
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fingers towards buttons. Shouldn’t each of those actions be explained by a 
local mental causation, implying the standard ‘plural’ interpretation of 
mind which would locate an observer in each parallel universe? 
That’s an option, but it’s not necessary. Just as Hydra’s utterance can 
be understood to be expressed by a set of parallel counterpart sonic 
emissions, so her intentional action can be understood to be expressed by a 
set of parallel counterpart bodily motions. If each bodily motion is taken to 
be locally caused by neural activity the question then remains as to how 
that neural activity is related to mentality. Does each brain instance a 
distinct mind or are all isomorphic brains instances of a single mind just as 
they are instances of a single physical form? It is the physical form of that 
neural activity which determines its causal powers. I should stress that no 
very fundamental distinction between minds and non-minds is being made 
here. If minds are supposed to arise out of the structural properties of 
brains then the idea is simply that numerically distinct brains with 
isomorphic structure instance a single mind. 
Now consider causality in Hydra’s environment. When she presses 
the button on her apparatus it causes the quantum measurement to be 
made. If causality is thought of as a mysterious relation of natural 
necessitation between the button and the rest of the apparatus then 
causation in Hydra’s environment is the set of individual causal relations. 
If causation is thought of as constant conjunction then, since the universes 
are parallel, a constant conjunction of events in each universe will be a 
constant conjunction of sets of events in Hydra’s environment. When 
constant conjunction ceases for a set of parallel universes they ‘diverge’, 
which is to say that they become anisomorphic. 
From now on I shall assume that the unitary interpretation of mind is 
an intelligible alternative to the standard plural interpretation which holds 
that minds may be qualitatively identical and numerically distinct. In that 
case, what the thought experiment with Hydra shows is that it’s intelligible 
for an observer to believe that when they conduct a quantum measurement 
with multiple outcomes they and their measuring device will fission into 
different branches of reality, each outcome occurring in a different branch. 
The modal interpretation of objective probability, which assumes that what 
	   9	  
happens in a quantum process is that one of a range of possibilities 
becomes actual, is revealed as a conjecture for which there is an 
alternative: the non-modal interpretation which assumes that what happens 
is fission, objective probabilities attaching to actualities issuing from a 
common cause. 
If Hydra comes to understand this, she’s free to drop the assumption 
that quantum evolution is stochastic. Even if she happens to inhabit one 
dendritic multiverse rather than an ensemble of cosmological parallel 
universes she is free to agree with what Everett  notoriously wrote: 
The whole issue of the translation from ‘possible’ to ‘actual’ is 
taken care of in the theory in a very simple way—there is no 
such transition, nor is such a transition necessary for the theory 
to be in accord with our experience. From the viewpoint of the 
theory all elements of a superposition (all ‘branches’) are 
‘actual’, none any more ‘real’ than the rest. 
(1957, 459, his emphasis)2 
 
The theory to which Everett refers is his ‘relative state’ formulation of 
quantum mechanics. In its modern version, in which the process of 
decoherence effectively defines the pointer basis, the idealised quantum 
measurement with outcomes L and R is understood as follows (Wallace, 
2012, 74-102). The measurement process, rather than being stochastic, 
involves the evolution of the measuring device into a linear superposition 
of apparatuses for which the outcomes L and R occur. Each of these 
components of the superposition a ‘branch’ of the multiverse and each 
branch has a quantum amplitude. It is the squared modului of those 
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  Note that Everett is not here using the term ‘actual’ in an indexical sense, 
as in Lewis’s ‘modal realism’ (1986) and adopted in (Wilson, 2013), of 
which more later. 
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amplitudes, as proportions of their total for all the branches, which the 
Born rule can be understood to interpret as an objective probability.3 
Hydra in the cosmological context fissions into a branch of reality 
where L occurs and a branch of reality where R occurs and yet she said, 
‘For this upcoming quantum measurement there are two possible outcomes 
and on statistical evidence I assign objective probabilities pL and pR to 
those outcomes, with subjective probability p(pL, pR)’. If she is to be 
charitably interpreted as speaking truly her term ‘possible outcomes’ has to 
be taken to refer to actual outcomes in her branching future. But to 
translate ‘possible’ as ‘actual’ would seem to undermine our modal 
discourse which would surely be an unacceptable consequence. More 
discussion is needed. 
 
3. Modal and non-modal objective probabilities 
 
We need to clarify Hydra’s use of the term ‘possible’ in that cosmological 
ensemble of parallel universes where stochastic quantum mechanics 
hypothetically operates. So, rather than focussing on a quantum 
measurement device in each universe we focus on a massive ratchet wheel 
which, like a roulette wheel, has numerals from ‘0’ to ‘36’ marked evenly 
around the periphery and a pointer beside which one or another number 
always comes to rest. With an average push the wheel takes a few tens of 
seconds to stop but once set in motion a linked apparatus consisting of a 
motion detector and computer is able to reliably predict which number will 
come to rest beside the pointer. Of course there will be quantum effects so 
the apparatus cannot be perfectly reliable but suppose that the unreliability 
is negligible. Assuming the law of large numbers, when a large ensemble 
of parallel counterpart ratchet wheels are set in motion the ensemble 
partitions into subsets where different numerals come to rest beside the 
pointer but for all but one of the numerals the measure of the subset of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This is a simplification since any given outcome branch will consist of 
very many microscopically different ‘sub-branches’ but that will not be 
important in the following argument. 
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universes where that numeral comes to rest is very small. As before, set 
aside these highly improbable stochastic outcomes; the partitioning is 
hugely dominated by a subset of universes which has a measure of almost 
unity.  
Hydra is now cast in the role of a punter who knows nothing of 
quantum mechanics and who is invited to gamble with the ratchet-wheel as 
she might with an ordinary roulette wheel. Bets must be placed within a 
few seconds of the wheel being set in motion, at which time Hydra hasn’t 
the slightest idea which number will come up, the readout on the 
prediction apparatus not being accessible. As the parallel counterpart 
wheels which are elements of Hydra’s wheel are set in motion she says, 
‘For this current spin of the wheel there are 37 possible outcomes and the 
probabilities for each are 1/37’. 
Recall that the charitable interpretation required by the unitary 
interpretation of mind in the context of a quantum measurement obliges us 
to translate Hydra’s term ‘possible outcome’ as ‘actual outcome’ but if the 
same translation is used here Hydra is clearly mistaken. Once her wheel is 
set in motion there is, for all practical purposes, just one actual outcome 
whose objective probability is unity. That is the quantum-mechanical 
objective probability for the outcome which would be predicted by the 
computer linked to a motion detector. The ratchet wheel behaves as if it 
were a classical device but its behaviour is strictly quantum-mechanical. In 
other words it is a ‘quasi-classical’ device. 
To speak of possible outcomes and their probabilities is a very 
common and natural way of speaking in roulette wheel contexts. What has 
happened is that Hydra has assigned subjective probabilities of 1/37 
(hereafter ‘credences’) on the basis of what are imagined to be objective 
probabilities, often called chances, attaching to entities referred to as 
possibilities. The true objective probabilities, which are quantum-
mechanical, apply to the actual branching of the ratchet wheel, which is 
hugely dominated by a single branch whose measure is almost unity. That 
is to say, the ratchet wheel in Hydra’s environment branches into subsets 
and one of those subsets has a measure close to unity relative the set of 
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ratchet wheels originally sent spinning, always assuming the law of large 
numbers. 
We have Hydra facing a ratchet wheel which has just been given a 
push and which is a set of parallel counterpart ratchet wheels. For all 
practical purposes Hydra does not fission when her ratchet wheel comes to 
rest. More accurately, she does fission but all but one of the branches into 
which she fissions is a subset of parallel universes with negligible measure 
on the entire set. There are not 37 branches of equal measure where each 
of the outcomes from 0 to 37 occurs. So when Hydra says, ‘For this 
current spin of the wheel there are 37 possible outcomes and the 
probabilities for each are 1/37’ she is clearly not assigning objective 
probabilities as in the case of the quantum measurement.  
The ratchet wheel shows the way to preserve ordinary modal 
discourse whilst proposing that objective probabilities, which only arise in 
quantum mechanics, should be assigned to actualities, not possibilities. If 
asked why she has a credence of 1/37 that the number 7 will come up  
Hydra may reply that the reason is that the (objective) ‘chance’ of that 
number coming up is 1/37 but there’s not an objective probability of 1/37 
that the spinning ratchet wheel will come to rest with the number 7 by the 
pointer. That’s a fiction. There’s an objective probability of almost unity 
that a particular number will come up, which may or may not be 7. 
So there are two distinct domains of discourse about objective 
probabilities. In one domain they are assigned to imaginary ‘possibilities’ 
which are projected out into the world as supposed warrants for credences, 
as in the case of Hydra’s attribution of outcome probabilities for the 
ratchet wheel, which she calls chances. That is the modal application of the 
term ‘objective probability’. What the existential status of those imagined 
possibilities is is a matter for modal theory. If they are understood to be 
real then they must be considered non-actual since only that part of reality 
described by quantum mechanics is what is being taken to be actual.  
But when Hydra assigned a probability of pR to the pointer pointing 
right she was assigning an objective probability to an actual outcome, a 
future branch of her environment. That is the non-modal and quantum-
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mechanical use of the term ‘objective probability’ which applies to 
actualities, not possibilities. 
The use of the unitary interpretation of mind in the context of a large 
ensemble of stochastic parallel universes shows that the concept of 
objective probabilities as values attaching to actual future branches of 
reality is intelligible. We are thus free to abandon the stochastic 
interpretation of objective probability and replace it with the dendritic 
interpretation. However, some lacunae in the picture need filling in. 
 
4. Uncertainty lost and regained 
 
We make decisions about future-directed action on the basis of credences, 
which are subjective values associated with alternative possibilities. That 
is particularly clear for quasi-classical games of chance where the 
alternative possibilities are assigned precise probabilities often commonly 
thought of as objective chances, as in the case of the ratchet wheel. In 
betting scenarios, ever the life blood of probability theory, it is generally 
accepted that the credences attaching to alternative possibilities should 
equal the presumed objective probabilities (chances) of those alternatives, 
what Lewis dubbed the Principal Principle (1980, 266). On placing a 
wager a punter is said to be uncertain which of the alternative possibilities 
will become actual even if s/he feels certain about what the chances are for 
each. To be certain about an outcome is to assign it a credence of unity. 
But uncertainty apparently disappears when probabilistic processes 
are understood to be dendritic rather than stochastic since the concept of 
alternative possible outcomes is replaced by that of co-actual outcomes. 
And this can seem to undermine any reason to place wagers for a person 
believing the dendritic interpretation of probability. To illustrate, imagine 
Hydra again, now in the context of an Everettian branching multiverse 
rather than a cosmological ensemble of parallel universes. Presume that 
she’s aware of her situation and is invited to place a wager at given odds 
on that idealised quantum measurement where there are two outcomes, L 
and R with objective probabilities pL and pR. If she believes that the 
apparatus and she herself will fission there are no possibilities in the offing 
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with which she can associate credences less than unity. She is simply 
certain that fission will take place and the distribution of losses and gains 
across a range of actual outcomes appears to be quite different from their 
distribution across a range of alternative possibilities. It is not at all 
obvious that Hydra has any reason to place a bet. 
There are two ways in which theorists have attempted retrieve 
uncertainty in this sort of situation, both of which involve the concept of 
self-location uncertainty. One of those ways is via a ‘divergence’ 
interpretation of Everettian theory. The basic idea is that branching is to be 
thought of as like a bundle of fibres diverging into tresses. In a quantum 
measurement situation an observer is one of a multitude of exact copies, 
each in what David Deutsch called ‘identical universes’ (1985, 20). As the 
measurement takes place the universes diverge into subsets where different 
outcomes occur but prior to the measurement each observer has self-
location uncertainty as to which sort of universe they inhabit. Recent 
variants on the theme have been proposed in (Saunders and Wallace, 2008; 
Saunders, 2010; Wilson, 2013). Clearly this is incompatible with the 
unitary interpretation of mind since the mind of a subject will span 
identical universes rather than inhabiting them individually so I shall not 
discuss divergence further.  
A second way of introducing self-location uncertainty to Everettian 
theory was first noted by Lev Vaidman (1998, 253). Suppose that Hydra is 
knowingly about to make the idealised branching measurement as before 
but she’s blindfolded so that she can’t see which way the pointer moves. 
Vaidman’s idea is that she fissions into HydraL on the L branch and 
HydraR on the R branch and that they are then each uncertain as to which 
branch they’re on. This idea needs some modification in the light of the 
unitary interpretation of mind because Hydra will not fission until some 
cognitive difference arises and I shall come to discussing that later. Setting 
that thought aside, Vaidman’s idea confronts two problems.  
The first problem is that post-measurement, pre-observation self-
location uncertainty doesn’t seem to help in providing a reason for Hydra 
to place a wager before the measurement since it comes too late, if it 
comes at all. This problem is addressed in (Tappenden, 2011b) and here is 
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a brief summary of the proposed solution. Hydra is told that she must lay a 
stake on one of the outcomes before the measurement in order for there to 
be a payout on that branch and she knows that it’s possible for her to be 
uncertain about which branch she’s on after the measurement. In that post-
measurement situation, since she would know the probabilities and offered 
payout, she could decide whether she wanted to lay a stake or not but of 
course it’s too late. However, Hydra knows before the measurement that if 
she were in a state of Vaidmanian uncertainty after the measurement and 
decided that it was worth laying a stake she would regret not having laid 
the stake beforehand. Thus Hydra has a good reason to lay a stake before 
the measurement if she believes that in the Vaidamanian situation she 
would judge the bet worth taking. Avoiding possible future regret provides 
a good reason to act. However, this does not imply that future-directed 
probabilistic decisions will always be unaffected by a shift from a standard 
stochastic view of quantum mechanics to a fission interpretation of 
Everett’s theory. Scenarios such as that suggested by Huw Price (2010, 
Section 6) may give rise to bizarre conundrums and there is the notorious 
phenomenon of quantum Russian roulette waiting in the wings 
(Tappenden, 2004, 158). 
Another problem for post-measurement, pre-observation, self-
location uncertainty is this. If blindfolded Hydra makes her measurement 
and fissions into HydraL and HydraR , each has to decide what credence to 
accord to the possibilities of being on one or the other branch. For self-
location uncertainty a principle of indifference seems compelling and has 
been argued for in detail by Adam Elga (2004). That implies that HydraL 
and HydraR each have no reason to suppose that she is on one branch 
rather than the other. In which case they should each assign a credence of 
½ to being on one or the other branch irrespective of the values of pL and 
pR. That is of course a disastrous result since what is supposed to be the 
objective probability of outcomes L and R, the relative squared moduli of 
amplitude for their branches, is irrelevant to HydraL’s and HydraR’s 
credence assignments. 
This problem has the potential to scupper the Everettian project in 
one fell swoop. Within a branching quantum multiverse a post-
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measurement, pre-observation subject is necessarily ignorant as to which 
type of outcome branch s/he’s on. And Everett’s idea can only make sense 
if such a subject assigns credences equal to the Born values for the 
outcome branches. Simply assuming that, and thus dismissing the principle 
of indifference by fiat, is what I have called the Born-Vaidman rule 
(2011b, Section 2). 
Sebens and Carroll have attempted to do better, arguing that the 
principle of indifference does not apply to self-location uncertainty in the 
post-measurement, pre-observation context because of what they call an 
Epistemic Separability Principle (ESP). And they go on to claim that from 
the ESP it can be shown that the credences HydraL and HydraR ought to 
assign to being on the L or R branch should be determined by the Born 
values of those branches. I shall now discuss Seben’s and Carroll’s 
argument in detail before going on to argue that their ESP is entailed by 
the unitary interpretation of mind. 
 
5. The Epistemic Separability Principle 
 
The framework which Sebens and Carroll use for their discussion is an 
adaptation of a thought experiment used in (Elga, 2000). They make it 
clear that this is an idealised scenario but it suffices to present the problem 
and their solution to it (ibid., 13-14).  
 
Once-or-Twice 
 
Alice’s particle (a) and Bob’s particle (b) are both 
initially prepared in the x-spin up eigenstate. Alice’s 
device measures the z-spin of her particle first. Then, 
Bob’s device, which is connected to Alice’s, measures z-
spin of particle b only if particle a was measured  to have 
z-spin up. By t1, the setup is prepared; by t2, Alice’s 
particle has been measured but Bob’s has not; by t3, both 
particles have been measured. Bob has been watching as 
the results of the experiments are recorded. Up through 
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t3, Alice has not looked at the measuring devices and is 
unaware of the results. By t4, Alice has looked at her 
device and seen the result of the measurement of particle 
a, although she remains ignorant about the z-spin of 
particle b. The branching structure of this scenario is 
shown [below]. 
  
(ibid., 8) 
Sebens’ and Carroll’s aim is to make the fission interpretation of 
Everettian theory intelligible so they interpret Once-or-Twice in the 
following way: 
 
There are two copies of Alice at t2 in Once-or-Twice. 
Each copy can reasonably wonder which one she is. 
Thus even if she (incredibly) knows the universal wave 
function exactly, Alice still has something to be 
uncertain of. She isn’t uncertain about the way the 
universe is; by supposition, she knows the wave function 
and this gives a complete specification of the state of the 
universe. Alice is uncertain about where she is in the 
quantum multiverse … She doesn’t know if she’s in the 
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branch of the wave function in which the detector 
displays up or the one in which it shows down. 
(ibid., 11) 
 
If the principle of indifference is to guide the downstream Alices’ 
credences as to the result of the measurement of particle a it looks as 
though the two Alices at t2 should assign credences of 1/2 to each 
possibility and the three Alices at t3 should assign credences of 2/3 and 1/3 
(ibid., 14). And yet all that has happened between t2 and t3 is that Bob has 
made the measurement on particle b which has no effect on the quantum 
amplitudes of the two downstream branches for particle a. Sebens and 
Carroll respond to this as follows: 
 
If indifference is right, there’s a strange switch in the 
probabilities between t2 and t3. Is there any reason to think this 
undermines the branch-counting strategy advocated by 
indifference? Wallace has argued that such a switch violates a 
constraint he calls ‘diachronic consistency’. In Appendix A, 
we argue that this is not the right diagnosis of the problem with 
the switch in credences. This kind of inconsistency is a 
common result of indifference and not something that should 
be taken to refute the principle. Still, we agree that there’s 
something wrong with the probability switch. 
(ibid.,15) 
 
In attempting to put the ‘something wrong’ right, Sebens and Carroll aim 
to escape this Vaidmanian impasse and in preparing the ground to 
introduce ESP they write: 
 
Between t2 and t3 what happens? Particle b is measured and 
Bob takes note of the result. Nothing happens to Alice, particle 
a, or Alice’s device. If nothing about Alice or her detector 
changes, why should her degree of belief that she bears a 
certain relation to the detector change? … Why should her 
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probability for being in different subsystems … of the (Alice + 
Dectector) system change when nothing about that system 
changes and she knows that she is somewhere in that system? 
It shouldn’t. 
(ibid., 15) 
 
To a critical eye this looks odd. In what sense does ‘nothing happen’ to 
Alice, particle a and her device between t2 and t3 ? She transits from 
having two copies to having three! However, there is a sense in which 
nothing happens : there is no cognitive change in Alice and no change in 
the relation between each copy of Alice and each copy of particle a and 
her device. All that has happened is that there has been a change in the 
environment exterior to the Alice-particle(a)-device subsystem, namely 
due to Bob’s measurement of particle b. 
Sebens’ and Carroll’s ESP captures that thought to suggest that the 
downstream Alices should not change their credences as to which branch 
of the Alice-particle(a)-device subsystem they are in: 
 
ESP: Suppose that universe U contains within it a set of 
subsystems, S; such that every agent in an internally 
qualitatively identical state to agent A is located in some 
subsystem that is an element of S. The probability that A ought 
to assign to being located in a particular subsystem, X  S, 
given that they are in U, is identical in any possible universe 
that also contains subsystems S in the same exact states (and 
does not contain any copies of the agent in an internally 
qualitatively identical state that are not located in S). 
(ibid., 16) 
 
 Nonetheless a critic may well insist that Sebens and Carroll have here 
simply stipulated their way out of the impasse by providing a principle 
specifically designed to do what they want, witness the ‘ought’, which 
extends to a ‘Strong ESP’ to preserve the principle of indifference for 
within-branch contexts (ibid., 24).  
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What the fission interpretation of Everettian theory needs is a more 
fundamental reason to accept ESP and reject indifference. The unitary 
interpretation of mind can provide just that. I shall now demonstrate why it 
entails ESP and why it’s not important that the principle of indifference is 
thereby lost for within-branch contexts.  
 
6. Alice in wonderland 
 
Here is the Once-or-Twice setup again: 
 
 
And here’s the analysis applying the unitary interpretation of mind. 
Between t1 and t2 the measuring device for particle a fissions into two 
devices, one showing the result up and the other showing the result down, 
each having the same amplitude. As a result Alice’s body fissions also, but 
her mind does not since she has not become aware of the outcome of the 
measurement of particle a, nor has any consequence of that measurement 
had any sensory effect for her.  
There’s an alternative way to put this, responding to the point made 
by Adrian Kent that nothing in the formalism forces us to speak of the 
fissioning of the measurement device and Alice’s body (2015, 214). We 
can simply say that the measurement device evolves into a superposition 
of showing up and down, and that Alice’s body, on becoming entangled 
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with that superposition, also evolves into a superposition on the pointer 
basis. However, Alice remains a single subject because there is no sensory 
or cognitive difference between the components of her bodily 
superposition.  
Taking the analysis of Hydra in parallel universes as a guide, at t2 
Alice’s body would a doubleton set with one element on the a-up  branch 
and one element on the a-down branch and the measuring device in Alice’s 
environment would also be a set of two measuring devices, each with the 
same quantum amplitude. However, for Alice in a branching multiverse 
the set-theoretic analysis is not required. The reason is that the concept of 
linear superposition introduces a new type of part-whole relationship to 
physics. The components of a superposition are neither spatial parts nor 
temporal parts but they can be considered to be ‘superpositional’ parts4.   
What is more, the relationship between a superposition and its 
component parts is such that the superposition only has definite physical 
properties if all its parts share that property, exactly as was required for the 
set-theoretic analysis of Hydra in the context of multiple parallel 
universes. Of course, cosmological parallel universes may still exist in an 
Everettian context and so the set-theoretic analysis may still have a place, 
but since we are now considering a single causally isolated and spatially 
finite “observable” universe, that thought can be set aside. The upshot is 
that at t2 the measuring device in Alice’s environment is in an equal-
amplitude macroscopic linear superposition of showing up and down. 
Between t2 and t3 the b-device on the a-up branch fissions causing 
the superpositional component of Alice’s body on the a-up branch to 
fission so Alice’s body now has three components, two on the a-up branch 
and one on the a-down branch. However, the operation of the b-device has 
no effect on the quantum amplitudes of the a-up and a-down branches. 
Then Alice observers the a-device and that causes a cognitive difference to 
arise between the component of her body on the a-down branch and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In (Tappenden, 2000, 105) I refer to those parts as superslices, being 
parts of superpositions which bear some resemblance to so-called 
timeslices.  
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two components of her body on the a-up branch. As a consequence, Alice 
fissions into AliceUP who observes a-up and AliceDOWN who observes a-
down. For AliceUP the b-device is still in linear superposition. 
It’s now clear why the unitary mind analysis of Sebens’ and 
Carroll’s Once-or-Twice entails their ESP.  At t3 Alice’s environment 
includes macroscopic linear superpositions of both the a-pointer and the b-
pointer but the amplitudes of the a-pointer superposition are in no way 
affected by the amplitudes of the b-pointer superposition. Between t3 and t4 
Alice’s mind fissions because she observes the a-pointer but she does not 
observe the b-pointer so that remains in superposition. Alice fissions into 
AliceUP for whom the a-pointer indicates up (and for whom the b-pointer 
is in superposition) and AliceDOWN for whom the b-pointer is not in 
superposition as it remains in the ready state. AliceUP’s body thus has two 
superpositional components. 
So, what we have seen is that the unitary interpretation of mind, 
applied in the context of a cosmological ensemble of spatially separated 
parallel universes for which a stochastic conception of objective 
probability is assumed, demonstrates that an alternative dendritic 
conception of probability is intelligible. And that is so despite the strong 
intuition that the very meaning of the term ‘objective probability’ involves 
stochasticity. Furthermore, the unitary interpretation of mind entails 
Sebens’ and Carroll’s ESP from which they derive the Born rule for 
Everettian theory. 
However, recall that it was claimed that to have reason to place a 
wager prior to a measurement Alice would need to be able to appeal to 
post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty and from the unitary 
interpretation of mind it follows that Alice post-measurement, pre-
observation is not in a state of uncertainty. But uncertainty is easily 
recovered. At t2 let a bell ring on the a-up branch and a whistle blow on 
the a-down branch without Alice knowing which sound goes with which 
branch. She will fission and although the resulting AliceUP and AliceDOWN 
will not be cognitively identical they will still be able to wonder which 
branch each is on. 
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Notice that the ‘possiblities’ of self-location are fictional in the sense 
that AliceUP is actually on the up branch and AliceDOWN is actually on the 
down branch. The right question for each to be asking is, ‘What is the 
probability of the branch I’m on relative to the measurement event?’. That 
is to take a branch’s probability as being a relation between physical 
properties which can be thought of as a novel ‘superpositional’ form of 
extension. 
Having introduced the ESP to block the use of the principle of 
indifference in which-branch contexts Sebens and Carroll go on to 
introduce a ‘strengthened’ ESP to preserve indifference for within-branch 
contexts. On the face of it, this looks problematic for the unitary 
interpretation of mind which excludes the use of the principle of 
indifference in any context which presumes the existence of qualitatively 
identical and numerically distinct minds. However the apparent conflict 
has no consequence if the unitary interpretation of mind yields the same 
credences for within-branch contexts as does the principle of indifference, 
which I shall argue is the case. The problem can be set up by adapting an 
example introduced in (Elga, 2004) and used by Sebens and Carroll (op 
cit., 13). 
 
7. Dr. Evil in wonderland 
 
Dr. Evil is plotting the destruction of Earth from his lunar battle station 
when he receives an unwelcome message. Back on Earth some pesky 
philosophers have created two copies of the entirety of his battle station, 
perfectly replicating every piece of furniture, every weapon, and every 
piece of food, even replicating the stale moon air and somehow the weaker 
gravitational field. They went so far that at time t they created two copies 
of Dr. Evil’s body. 
According to the standard plural interpretation of mind there are 
three people involved here, Dr. Evil on the moon and two people with 
qualitatively identical minds to his on Earth. From the principle of 
indifference it follows that Dr. Evil should assign a credence of two thirds 
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to seeing a terrestrial landscape when he opens the battle station door 
because he could just as well be any one of the three people. 
On the unitary interpretation there is one person, Dr. Evil, whose 
body has three isomorphic elements. His battle station has three 
isomorphic elements too but the environment beyond is different, it is what 
might be called a classical superposition, like the contents of Hydra’s 
black box in cosmological parallel universes. The external environment 
has one element which is lunar and two elements which are terrestrial. If 
Dr. Evil believes the unitary interpretation then he believes that on opening 
the door he will fission into Lunar Evil seeing a lunar landscape and 
Earthly Evil seeing a terrestrial landscape and that Lunar Evil will have a 
body with one element and Earthly Evil a body with two elements. From 
this perspective, what credence should Dr. Evil assign to seeing a 
terrestrial landscape when he opens the door? 
He can reason as follows. Suppose his mind spanned a large 
ensemble of cosmological stochastic parallel universes and suppose that a 
stochastic process with two possible outcomes, moon and earth, were to 
take place outside the battle station where the probability pmoon=1/3 and 
pearth=2/3. In that case, assuming the law of large numbers, he should 
assign a credence of 2/3 to seeing the outcome earth on opening the door 
since that is the objective probability for that outcome.  
So Dr. Evil can conclude that if his environment is a classical 
superposition with a finite number of elements then the proportions of 
those elements corresponding to each component of that superposition 
should be treated as if they were objective probabilities and so guide his 
credence assignments to the seeing of different outcomes on observing the 
superposition. To be sure, the creation of the duplicate battle stations has 
not been a stochastic process but what the idea of a large, finite, stochastic 
ensemble of universes shows for the unitary interpretation of mind is that 
the proportions of elements in a finite classical superposition can be 
regarded as if  they were objective probabilities. 
That suggests that Dr.Evil should treat the unobserved classical 
superposition of the lunar and terrestrial environments with one and two 
elements respectively as if it were a linear superposition with those same 
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Born values, in which case he should assign a credence of 2/3 to seeing a 
terrestrial environment on opening the door, just like the three Dr. Evil 
doppelgangers of the plural interpretation of mind.  
 
8. Parting Lines 
 
What is being proposed is a radical change of perspective. Macroscopic 
linear superpositions can easily exist in the environment of an observer, 
only requiring that s/he be perceptually isolated from quantum 
measurements and similar decoherence phenomena in her past light cone. 
A person’s brain can be a macroscopic linear superposition so long as 
there are no sensory or cognitive differences between its components 
(conscious or unconscious).  Probabilistic processes are to be thought of as 
dendritic rather than stochastic, implying no distinction between 
possibility and actuality within an Everettian multiverse, just as Everett 
emphasised in his famous footnote. Objective probability inhabits the 
actual world, not the realm of possibilia. 
That’s why, when blindfolded Alice hears a bell ring and asks 
herself what credence to give to being in a branch with relative probability 
pR or pL she takes what Vaidman calls the measure or existence of the 
branches into account (1998, Section 9; Groisman, Hallakoun and 
Vaidman, 2013). Vaidman rejects stochastic probability but there is no 
reason for him to reject dendritic probability, in which case objective 
probability just is a relation between the measures of existence of 
branches. And the objective probability of her branch relative to the 
measurement event is what, by any reasonable standards, guides Alice’s 
credence that she’s on it.   
What emerges is that Everettian theory is not so much an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics as an interpretation of the very 
concept of objective probability itself. Decoherence is a discovery 
independent of Everett’s theory and perfectly compatible with a stochastic 
metaphysics as is well demonstrated by Murray Gell-Mann and James 
Hartle (2011). So decoherence does not bring some sort of Everettian 
influence to quantum mechanics. It’s the other way round; decoherence 
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simply provides an approximate pointer basis which picks out the dendritic 
structure which Everett had in mind. 
This is all very counterintuitive. It seems compelling that if we are 
about to place a bet on a quantum measurement with given probabilities 
for outcomes we must be uncertain about what will happen. But that turns 
out not to be so, the possibility of being able to make post-measurement, 
pre-observation credence assignments can do all the work of giving a 
reason to place the bet before the measurement. 
A final point worth making is this. The unitary interpretation of mind 
provides a unique defence of semantic internalism against the very 
influential challenge of Twin Earth thought experiments, as is argued in 
(Tappenden, 2011a). And a currently very promising theory of mind, 
Prediction Error Minimization, apparently requires semantic internalism 
(Hohwy, 2016, 24, note 8 ). If semantic internalism is correct then the 
meaning of the term ‘probabilistic process’ cannot be determined by the 
constitution of the external world. In which case probabilistic processes 
cannot be assumed to be stochastic just because that is taken to be what we 
commonly mean by the term which refers to them. The idea that if  
objective probability exists it must be stochastic is no more than a 
hypothesis about the world and we have seen that an alternative hypothesis 
is available, that of dendritic probability. 
The unitary interpretation of mind has many other implications. It 
brings a novel perspective to the Boltzmann-brain and measure problems 
in cosmology and to philosophical problems to do with the concepts of 
unconscious ‘zombies’, personal teleportation and mind uploading. 
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